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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

grounds of implied covenant, is apparent. Neither can the vendor enforce performance or can the ultimate purchaser be restrained from
"violating" the repealed restrictive ordinance.
I.E.G.
Highways Cutting corner in making left turn negligence per
se. Automobilists not justified in violating statute because following directions of highway officers.-There is no doubt but that the
decision by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the case of Day
v. Pauly,' 186 Wis. 189, 202 N. W 363, should have received some
attention soon after it was handed down on February io, 1925, but,
through some oversight it was missed. However, the delay has given
the reviewer an opportunity to show how subsequent legislation may be
influenced by decisions of the courts of last resort.
The automobile collision out of which the action grew occurred at
the intersection of highways 15 and 55. (Highway 55 runs north and
south, highway 15 runs east and west)
Pauly was driving south on
55 and Day east on 15. At the intersection Day made a left turn and,
in following white arrows painted on the concrete pavement by county
traffic officers, he cut the corner and drove out in 'front of Pauly who
became confused and turned to the left side of highway 55 where the
crash took place. Day'brought an action against Pauly for damages
and the jury found Day guilty of contributory negligence and decided
in favor of the defendant. The trial judge, on motion of the plaintiff,
set the verdict aside and granted a new trial. From this the defendant
appealed and the superior court reversed the order and directed judgment on the verdict for the defendant.
The Supreme Court, after disposing of the case, continued with
dicta which furnishes the principal material for this comment. Justice
Rosenberry cited section 85.O1, subd. 3 of the Wisconsin Statutes and
held the plaintiff guilty of negligence per se in that he had violated the
provisions of that statute by cutting the corner, and went on as follows
In this connection we think it our duty to call the attention of highway officials
and police officers to the fact that they have no right or authority to divert or
direct public travel in a manner contrary to that prescribed by the act of the
Legislature. It was apparently indicated to the plaintiff that he should travel in

substantially the path he took, but travelers are not warranted or justified 'i proceding according to the direction of highway officials, police authorities or local
nmuicipal bodies, where such directions are contrary to the express provisons of
the law, and travelers are afforded no protection because they are thus induced to
violate the law. If it is thought best that the rigid rule prescribed by the statute
should be varied in particular cases where the facts warrant such variation, then
the Legislature should authorize some one to establish lawful departures from the
general rule. We find no such authority under the law of this state and none
has been cited to our attention.
It is a matter of common observation that
by painting arrows and by other signs and indications, travelers are led into violation of the plain provisions of the statute. Local authorities who take upon
themselves the doing of such acts assume a considerable moral responsibility at
least. This is particularly true with reference to travelers from outside the state.
who ought to have a right to depend upon signs and directions for travel placed
upon highways by those in charge of them. We feel it our duty to call this
matter to the attention of those having to do with the enforcement of the laws
relating to highways as well as to the Legislature.
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NOTES AND COMMENT

The words of the court are sufficient to detail the situation which
came into existence on the footsteps of this decision. Considering the
number of foreign motorists who visit the state during the summer
months, the complications that might result would be many Unscrupulous traffic officers could lead innocent drivers into senous 'situations and subject them to unjust court actions without incurring more
than a moral obligation. The court is tobe commended for calling attention to the gravity of the question.
The suggestion to the Legislature was well received for on May 22.
1925, section 85.oi, subd. 3 was amended to read as follows
Every such operator or driver shall keep to the right of the center of highway

intersections when turning to the right and shall pass to the right of such center

when turning to the left, EXCEPT WHERE MARKERS OR SIGNS SHALL
HAVE BEEN PLACED BY THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES HAVING
JURISDICTION OF THE HIGHWAY OR STREET, INDICATING OR
DIRECTING THAT PUBLIC TRAVEL SHALL FOLLOW A DIFFERENT
COURSE.

This amendment adjusts the former apparently unfair condition and
foreign, as well as local, drivers of automobiles can follow the orders
and directions of traffic officers without fear of violating the law In
a state like Wisconsin, which is visited yearly by thousands of tourists,
the law as it now stands is as it should be, and the Legislature is to be
congratulated for having acted so promptly after the suggestion given
by our Supreme Court.
H.U.A.
Wills

Condition in a will, requiring a forfeiture of substantial

sum in case of contesting, is against public policy, where there
exists probable cause and good faith.-In a recent Wisconsin case.
In Re Keenan's Will,' the will contained a provision that if any legatee
opposed the probate of the will, that person's legacy should be forfeited. The legatee contested on the ground of lack of testementary
capacity of the testatrix, and the lower court, ignoring the advisory
verdict of the jury which found that at the time of the execution of the
vill the testatrix did lack testamentary capacity, admitted the will to
probate. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court.2 Subsequently,
the executor petitioned the county court for a construction of the will
to determine whether or not the contestant had forfeited his legacy, and
the court, adhering to the terms of the will found that he had. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed this ruling, and held that, because
our constitution provides for every person's right to the remedies of
the law, and the right to obtain justice freely and without being obliged
to purchase it, completely and without denial 3 -to allow a condition of
this kind would be contrary to public policy in the view of such constitutional provision and the statutes which make it the duty, under
heavy penalty, of the county judges, executors, and all other persons
who have possession of wills to present them for probate. 4 After
205 N.W iooi (Nov. 1925).
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'Art. i, Sec. 9, Wis. Const.
"Sec. 310.01, 310.03, Wis. Stat.

